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Abstract—Recent studies show that the fast growing expansion
of wind power generation may lead to extremely high levels of
price volatility in wholesale electricity markets. Storage technolo-
gies, regardless of their specific forms e.g. pump-storage hydro,
large-scale or distributed batteries, are capable of alleviating the
extreme price volatility levels due to their energy usage time
shifting, fast-ramping and price arbitrage capabilities. In this
paper, we propose a stochastic bi-level optimization model to find
the optimal nodal storage capacities required to achieve a certain
price volatility level in a highly volatile electricity market. The
decision on storage capacities is made in the upper level problem
and the operation of strategic/regulated generation, storage and
transmission players is modeled at the lower level problem using
an extended Cournot-based stochastic game. The South Australia
(SA) electricity market, which has recently experienced high levels
of price volatility, is considered as the case study for the proposed
storage allocation framework. Our numerical results indicate that
80% price volatility reduction in SA electricity market can be
achieved by installing either 340 MWh regulated storage or 420
MWh strategic storage. In other words, regulated storage firms
are more efficient in reducing the price volatility than strategic
storage firms.
Index Terms—Price volatility, Electricity market, Bi-level op-
timization model, Storage technologies, Strategic and regulated
firms.
I. INTRODUCTION
A high level of intermittent wind generation may result in
high price volatility in electricity markets [1]–[3]. In the long
term, extreme levels of price volatility can lead to undesirable
consequences such as bankruptcy of retailers [4] and market
suspension. In a highly volatile electricity market, the partici-
pants, such as generators, utility companies and large industrial
consumers, are exposed to a high level of financial risk as well
as costly risk management strategies [5]. In some electricity
markets, e.g., Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM),
which has experienced high levels of price volatility [6], the
market is suspended if the sum of spot prices over a certain
period of time is more than cumulative price threshold (CPT).
A highly volatile market is subject to frequent CPT breaches
due to the low conventional capacity and high level of wind
variability.
The current paper proposes a stochastic optimization frame-
work for finding the required nodal storage capacities in elec-
tricity markets with high levels of wind penetration such that
the price volatility in the market is kept below a certain level.
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1) A bi-level optimization model is proposed to find the
optimal nodal storage capacities required for avoiding
the extreme price volatility levels in a nodal electricity
market.
2) In the upper level problem, the total storage capacities are
minimized subject to a price volatility target constraint
in each node and at each time.
3) In the lower level problem, the non-cooperative in-
teraction between generation, transmission and storage
players in the market is modeled as a stochastic Cournot-
based game with an exponential inverse demand func-
tion. Note that the equilibrium prices at the lower level
problem are functions of the storage capacities. The
operation of storage devices at the lower level problem
is modeled without introducing binary variables.
4) The existence of Nash equilibrium under the exponential
inverse demand function is established for the lower level
problem.
Under the proposed framework, the size of storage devices
at two nodes of South Australia (SA) and Victoria (VIC) in
NEM is determined such that the market price volatility is kept
below a desired level at all times. The desired level of price
volatility can be determined based on various criteria such as
net revenue earned by the market players, occurrence frequency
of undesirable prices, number of CPT breaches, etc [7].
The proposed storage allocation framework allows the policy
makers and market/system operators to compute the required
nodal storage capacities for managing the price volatility level
in electricity markets. Although the current cost of storage
systems is relatively high, the support from governments (in the
form of subsidies) and the eventual decline of the technology
cost can lead to large scale integration of storage systems in
electricity markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The existing
related literature is discussed in Section II. The system model
and the proposed bi-level optimization problem are formulated
in Section III. The equilibrium analysis of the lower level
problem and the solution method are presented in Section
IV. The simulation results are presented in Section V. The
conclusion remarks are discussed in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
The problem of optimal storage operation or storage allo-
cation for facilitating the integration of intermittent renewable
energy generators in electricity networks has been studied in
[8]–[15], with total cost minimization objective functions, and
in [16]–[20], with profit maximization goals. However, the
price volatility management problem using optimal storage
allocation has not been investigated in the literature.
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2The operation of a storage system is optimized, by mini-
mizing the total operation costs in the network, to facilitate
the integration of intermittent renewable resources in power
systems in [8]. Minimum (operational/installation) cost storage
allocation problem for renewable integrated power systems is
studied in [9]–[11] under deterministic wind models, and in
[12] under a stochastic wind model. The minimum-cost storage
allocation problem is studied in a bi-level problem in [13],
[14], with the upper and lower levels optimizing the allocation
and the operation, respectively. The paper [15] investigates the
optimal sizing, siting, and operation strategies for a storage
system to be installed in a distribution company controlled area.
We note that these works only study the minimum cost storage
allocation or operation problems, and the interplay between the
storage firms and other participants in the market has not been
investigated in these works.
The paper [16] studies the optimal operation of a storage
unit, with a given capacity, which aims to maximize its profit
in the market from energy arbitrage and provision of regulation
and frequency response services. The paper [17] computes the
optimal supply and demand bids of a storage unit so as to
maximize the storage’s profit from energy arbitrage in the
day-ahead and the next 24 hour-ahead markets. The paper
[18] investigates the profit maximization problem for a group
of independently-operated investor-owned storage units which
offer both energy and reserve in both day-ahead and hour-ahead
markets. In these works, the storage firm receives the market
price as an exogenous input, i.e. the storage is modeled as a
price taker firm due to its small capacity.
The operation of a price maker storage device is optimized
using a bi-level stochastic optimization model, with the lower
level clearing the market and the upper level maximizing the
storage profit by bidding on price and charge/discharge in [19].
The storage size in addition to its operation is optimized in
the upper level problem in [20] when the lower level problem
clears the market. Note that the energy and price bids of market
participants other than the storage firm are treated exogenously
in these models.
In [21], [22], the storage firms are modeled as strategic
players in Cournot-based electricity markets. However, they do
not study storage sizing problem and the effect of intermittent
renewables on the market. Therefore, to the best of our
knowledge, the problem of finding optimal storage capacity
subject to a price volatility management target in electricity
markets has not been addressed before.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a nodal electricity market with I nodes. Let N cgi
be the set of classical generators, such as coal and gas power
plants, located in node i and Nwgi be the set of wind firms
located in node i. The set of neighboring nodes of node i is
denoted by Ni. Since the wind availability is a stochastic pa-
rameter, a scenario-based model, with Nw different scenarios,
is considered to model the wind availability in the electricity
network. The nodal prices in our model are determined by
solving a Cournot-based game among all market participants,
that is, classical generators, wind firms, storage firms and
transmission interconnectors which are introduced in detail in
the lower level problem. More precisely, the market price in
node i at time t under the wind availability scenario w is given
by an exponential function:
Pitw (qitw)=αite
−βit
qsitw+ ∑
m∈Nwg
i
qwgmitw+
∑
n∈Ncg
i
qcgnitw+
∑
j∈Ni
qtrijtw

(1)
where αit, βit are positive real values in the inverse demand
function, qcgnitw is the generation strategy of the nth classical
generator located in node i at time t under scenario w, qwgmitw
is the generation strategy of the mth wind generator located in
node i at time t under scenario w, qsitw is the charge/discharge
strategy of the storage firm in node i at time t under scenario
w, qtrijtw is the strategy of transmission firm located between
node i and node j at time t under scenario w. The collection
of strategies of all firms located in node i at time t under the
scenario w is denoted by qitw.
In this paper, we propose a bi-level optimization approach
for finding the minimum required total storage capacity in
the market such that the market price volatility stays within
a desired limit at each time.
A. Upper-level Problem
In the upper-level optimization problem, we determine the
nodal storage capacities such that a price volatility constraint is
satisfied in each node at each time. In this paper, the variance of
market price is considered as a measure of price volatility. The
variance of the market price in node i at time t, i.e. Var
(
Pitw
)
,
can be written as:
Var (Pitw) = Ew
[
(Pitw (qitw))
2
]
− (Ew [P (qitw)])2
=
∑
w
(
Pitw (qitw)
)2
Ψw −
(∑
w
Pitw (qitw) Ψw
)2
(2)
where Ψw is the probability of scenario w.
The notion of variance quantifies the effective variation
range of random variables, i.e. a random variable with a
small variance has a smaller effective range of variation when
compared with a random variable with a large variance.
Given the price volatility relation (2) based on the Nash
Equilibrium (NE) strategy collection of all firms q?itw, the
upper-level optimization problem is given by:
min
{Qsi}i
I∑
i=1
Qsi
s.t.
Qsi ≥ 0 ∀i (3a)
Var (Pitw (q
?
itw)) ≤ σ20 ∀i, t (3b)
where Qsi is the storage capacity at node i, Pitw (q
?
itw) is the
market price at node i at time t under the wind availability
scenario w, and σ20 is the price volatility target. The price
volatility of the market is defined as the maximum variance
of market price, i.e. maxit Var(Pitw(q?itw)).
B. Lower-level Problem
In the lower-level problem, the nodal market prices and the
NE strategies of firms are obtained by solving an extended
stochastic Cournot game between wind generators, storage
firms, transmission firms, and classical generators. In our for-
mulation, storage and transmission firms can be either regulated
or strategic players.
3Definition 1: A strategic firm decides on its strategies over
the operation horizon {1, ..., NT} such that its aggregate ex-
pected profit, over the operation horizon, is maximized. On the
other hand, a regulated firm aims to maximize the net market
value, i.e. the social welfare.
In what follows, the variable µ is used to indicate the
associated Lagrange variable with its corresponding constraint
in the model.
1) Wind Generators: The NE strategy of the mth wind
generator in node i is obtained by solving the following
optimization problem:
max
{qwgmitw}tw0
∑
w
Ψw
NT∑
t=1
Pitw (qitw) q
wg
mitw
s.t.
qwgmitw ≤ Qwgmitw : µwg,maxmitw ∀t, w (4a)
where qwgmitw and Q
wg
mitw are the generation level and the
available wind capacity of the mth wind generator located
in node i at time t under scenario w. Note that the wind
availability changes in time in a stochastic manner, and the
wind firm’s bids depend on the wind availability. As a result,
the nodal prices and decisions of the other firms become
stochastic in our model.
2) Storage Firms: Storage firms benefit from price differ-
ence at different times to make profit, i.e. they sell the off-
peak stored electricity at higher prices at peak times. The NE
strategy of storage firm located in node i is determined by
solving the following optimization problem:
max
{qdisitw,qchitw}tw0
,{qsitw}tw
∑
w
Ψw
NT∑
t=1
Pitw (qitw) q
s
itw − csi
(
qdisitw+
qchitw
)− γsi (Pitw (qitw) qsitw + Pitw (qitw)βit
)
(5a)
s.t.
qsitw = η
dis
i q
dis
itw −
qchitw
ηchi
: µsitw ∀t, w (5b)
qdisitw ≤ ζdisi Qsi : µdis,maxitw ∀t, w (5c)
qchitw ≤ ζchi Qsi : µch,maxitw ∀t, w (5d)
0 ≤
t∑
k=1
(
qchikw − qdisikw
)
∆ ≤ Qsi : µs,minitw , µs,maxitw ∀t, w (5e)
where qdisitw and q
ch
itw are the discharge and charge levels of the
storage firm in node i at time t under scenario w, respectively,
csi is the unit operation cost, η
ch
i ,η
dis
i are the charging and
discharging efficiencies, respectively, and qsitw is the net sup-
ply/demand of the storage firm in node i. The parameter ζchi
(ζdisi ) is the percentage of storage capacity Q
s
i , which can be
charged (discharged) during time period ∆. It is assumed that
the storage devices are initially fully discharged. The energy
level of the storage device in node i at each time is limited by
its capacity Qsi . Note that the nodal market prices depend on
the storage capacities, i.e. Qsis, through the constraints (5c)-
(5e). This dependency allows the market operator to meet the
volatility constraint using the optimal values of the storage
capacities.
The storage firm in node i acts as a strategic firm in the
market if γsi is equal to zero and acts as a regulated firm if γ
s
i
is equal to one. The difference between regulated and strategic
players corresponds to the strategic price impacting capability.
Note that the derivative of objective function of the regulated
storage firm i is proportional to P (·) − csi . This intuitively
suggests that a regulated storage firm prefers to reduce the
market price to its operation cost while it discharges.
Proposition 1: At the NE of the lower level game, each
storage firm is either in the charge mode or discharge mode,
i.e. the charge and discharge levels of each storage firm cannot
be simultaneously positive at the NE.
Proof: See Appendix A.
3) Classical Generators: Classical generators include coal,
gas, and nuclear power plants. The NE strategy of nth classical
generator located in node i is determined by solving the
following optimization problem:
max
{qcgnitw}tw0
∑
w
Ψw
NT∑
t=1
(Pitw (qitw)− ccgni) qcgnitw
s.t.
qcgnitw ≤ Qcgni : µcg,maxnitw ∀t, w (6a)
qcgnitw − qcgni(t−1)w ≤ Rupni : µcg,upnitw ∀t, w (6b)
qcgni(t−1)w − qcgnitw ≤ Rdnni : µcg,dnnitw ∀t, w (6c)
where qcgnitw is the generation level of the nth classical gen-
erator in node i at time t under scenario w, Qcgni and cni
are the capacity and the short term marginal cost of the nth
classical generator in node i, respectively. The constraints (6b)
and (6c) ensure that the ramping limitations of the nth classical
generator in node i are always met.
4) Transmission Firms: The NE strategy of the transmission
firm between nodes i and j is determined by solving the
following optimization problem:
max
{qtrjitw,qtrijtw}tw
∑
w
Ψw
NT∑
t=1
(
Pjtw
(
qjtw
)
qtrjitw+Pitw (qitw) q
tr
ijtw
)
(
1− γtrij
)
+ γtrij
(
Pjtw
(
qjtw
)
−βjt +
Pitw (qitw)
−βit
)
s.t.
qtrijtw = −qtrjitw : µtrijtw ∀t, w (7a)
−Qtrij ≤ qtrijtw ≤ Qtrij : µtr,minijtw , µtr,maxijtw ∀t, w (7b)
where qtrijtw is the electricity exchange level between nodes i
and j at time t under scenario w, and Qtrij is the capacity of the
transmission line between node i and node j. The transmission
firm between nodes i and j behaves as a strategic player when
γtrij is equal to zero and behaves as a regulated player when
γtrij is equal to one. Note that the term Pjtw
(
qjtw
)
qtrjitw +
Pitw (qitw) q
tr
ijtw in the objective function of the transmission
firm is equal to
(
Pjtw
(
qjtw
)− Pitw (qitw)) qtrjitw which im-
plies that the transmission firm between two nodes makes profit
by transmitting electricity from the node with lower market
price to the node with higher market price.
Transmission lines or interconnectors are usually controlled
by the market operator and are regulated to maximize the
social welfare in the market. The markets with regulated
transmission firms are discussed as electricity markets with
transmission constraints in the literature, e.g., see [23]–[25].
However, some electricity markets allow the transmission lines
4to act strategically, i.e. to make revenue by trading electricity
across the nodes [26].
IV. SOLUTION APPROACH
In this section, we first provide a game-theoretic analysis
of the lower-level problem. Next, the bi-level price volatility
management problem is transformed to a single optimization
Mathematical Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC).
A. Game-theoretic Analysis of the Lower-level Problem
To solve the lower-level problem, we need to study the
best response functions of firms participating in the market.
Then, any intersection of the best response functions of all
firms will be a NE. In this subsection, we first establish the
existence of NE for the lower-level problem. Then, we provide
the necessary and sufficient conditions which can be used to
solve the lower-level problem.
To transform the bi-level price volatility management prob-
lem to a single level problem, we need to ensure that for every
vector of storage capacities, i.e. Qs = [Qs1, · · · , QsI ]> ≥ 0,
the lower-level problem admits a NE. At the NE strategy of
the lower-level problem, no single firm has any incentive to
unilaterally deviate its strategy from its NE strategy. Note that
the objective function of each firm is quasi-concave in its
strategy and constraint set of each firm is closed and bounded
for all Qs = [Qs1, · · · , QsI ]> ≥ 0. Thus, the lower level game
admits a NE. This result is formally stated in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: For any vector of storage capacities, Qs =
[Qs1, · · · , QsI ]> ≥ 0, the lower level game admits a Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof: Note that the objective function of each firm is
continuous and quasi-concave in its strategy. Also, the strategy
space is non-empty, compact and convex. Therefore, according
to Theorem 1.2 in [27], the lower level game admits a NE.
1) Best responses of wind firm mi: Let q−(mi) be the strate-
gies of all firms in the market except the wind generator m
located in node i. Then, the best response of the wind generator
m in node i to q−(mi) satisfies the necessary and sufficient
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (t ∈ {1, ..., NT};w ∈
{1, ..., Nw}):
Pitw (qitw) +
∂Pitw(qitw)
∂qwgmitw
qwgmitw −
µwg,maxmitw
Ψw
≤ 0 ⊥ qwgmitw ≥ 0
(8a)
qwgmitw ≤ Qwgmitw ⊥ µwg,maxmitw ≥ 0 (8b)
where the perpendicularity sign, ⊥, means that at least one of
the adjacent inequalities must be satisfied as an equality [28].
2) Best responses of storage firm i: To study the best
response of the storage firm in node i, let q−i denote the
collection of strategies of all firms except the storage firm
in node i. Then, the best response of the storage firm in
node i is obtained by solving the following KKT conditions
(t ∈ {1, ..., NT};w ∈ {1, ..., Nw}):
Pitw (qitw) + (1− γsi )
∂Pitw (qitw)
∂qsitw
qsitw +
µsitw
Ψw
= 0 (9a)
−ηdisi µsitw−µdis,maxitw −∆
∑NT
k=t
(
µs,minikw −µs,maxikw
)
Ψw
− csi ≤ 0
⊥ qdisitw ≥ 0 (9b)
µsitw
ηchi
+µch,minitw −µch,maxitw +∆
∑NT
k=t
(
µs,minikw −µs,maxikw
)
Ψw
−csi≤0
⊥ qchitw ≥ 0 (9c)
qsitw = η
dis
i q
dis
itw −
qchitw
ηchi
(9d)
qdisitw ≤ ζdisi Qsi ⊥ µdis,maxitw ≥ 0 (9e)
qchitw ≤ ζchi Qsi ⊥ µch,maxitw ≥ 0 (9f)
0 ≤
t∑
k=1
(
qchikw − qdisikw
)
∆ ⊥ µs,minitw ≥ 0 (9g)
t∑
k=1
(
qchikw − qdisikw
)
∆ ≤ Qsi ⊥ µs,maxitw ≥ 0 (9h)
3) Best responses of classical generation firm ni: The best
response of the classical generator n in node i to q−(ni), i.e.
the collection of strategies of all firms except the classical
generator n in node i, is obtained by solving the following
KKT conditions (t ∈ {1, ..., NT};w ∈ {1, ..., Nw}):
Pitw (qitw)−ccgni+
∂Pitw (qitw)
∂qcgnitw
qcgnitw+
−µcg,maxnitw +µcg,upni(t+1)w
Ψw
+
−µcg,upnitw + µcg,dnnitw − µcg,dnni(t+1)w
Ψw
≤ 0 ⊥ qcgnitw ≥ 0 (10a)
qcgnitw ≤ Qcgni ⊥ µcg,maxnitw (10b)
qcgnitw − qcgni(t−1)w ≤ Rupni ⊥ µcg,upnitw ≥ 0 (10c)
qcgni(t−1)w − qcgnitw ≤ Rdnni ⊥ µcg,dnnitw ≥ 0 (10d)
4) Best responses of transmission firm ij: Finally, the best
response of the transmission firm between nodes i and j, to
q−(ij), i.e. the set of all firms’ strategies except those of the
transmission line between nodes i and j, can be obtained using
the KKT conditions (t ∈ {1, ..., NT};w ∈ {1, ..., Nw}):
Pitw (qitw) +
(
1− γtrij
) ∂Pitw (qitw)
∂qtrijtw
qtrijtw +
µtrjitw + µ
tr
ijtw
Ψw
+
µtr,minijtw − µtr,maxijtw
Ψw
= 0 (11a)
qtrijtw = −qtrjitw (11b)
−Qtrij ≤ qtrijtw ⊥ µtr,minijtw ≥ 0 (11c)
qtrijtw ≤ Qtrij ⊥ µtr,maxijtw ≥ 0 (11d)
B. The Equivalent Single-level Problem
Here, the bi-level price volatility management problem is
transformed into a single-level MPEC. To this end, note that
for every vector of storage capacities the market price can
be obtained by solving the firms’ KKT conditions. Thus, by
imposing the KKT conditions of all firms as constraints in
the optimization problem (3), the price volatility management
problem can be written as the following single-level optimiza-
tion problem:
min
I∑
i=1
Qsi (12)
s.t.
(3a− 3b), (8a− 8b), (9a− 9h), (10a− 10d), (11a− 11d)
m ∈ {1, ..., Nwgi }, n ∈ {1, ..., N cgi }, i, j ∈ {1, ..., I},
t ∈ {1, ..., NT};w ∈ {1, ..., Nw}
5where the optimization variables are the storage capacities,
the bidding strategies of all firms and the set of all La-
grange multipliers. Because of the nonlinear complementary
constraints, the feasible region is not necessarily convex or
even connected. Therefore, increasing the storage capacities
stepwise, we solve the lower level problem, which is convex.
Once the price volatility constraint is addressed, the optimum
solution is found.
Remark 1: It is possible to convert the equivalent single
level problem (12) to a Mixed-Integer Non-Linear Problem
(MINLP). However, the large number of integer variables
potentially makes the resulting MINLP computationally infea-
sible.
V. CASE STUDY AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we study the impact of storage installation on
price volatility in two nodes of Australia’s National Electricity
Market (NEM): South Australia (SA) and Victoria (VIC). SA
has a high level of wind penetration and VIC has high coal-
fueled classical generation. Real data for price and demand
from the year 2013 is used to calibrate the inverse demand
function in the model. Different types of generation firms, such
as coal, gas, hydro, wind and biomass, with generation capacity
(intermittent and dispatchable) of 3.7 GW and 11.3 GW were
active in SA and VIC, respectively, in 2013. The transmission
line interconnecting SA and VIC, which is a regulated line,
has the capacity of 680 MW but currently is working with just
70% of its capacity. The generation capacities in our numerical
results are gathered from Australian Electricity Market Oper-
ator’s (AEMO’s) website (aemo.com.au) and all the prices are
shown in Australian dollar.
Similar to [29], we consider a scenario based analysis
wherein three scenarios, i.e. high wind scenario (with probabil-
ity of 0.2), low wind scenario (with probability 0.2) and base
wind scenario (with probability of 0.6), are defined to capture
the wind power availability. The base wind scenario indicates
the available wind generation level for a day (24 hours), in each
node, averaged over a year [30]. Given that the wind turbines
are dispersed over the whole region in each node, we assume
that the wind power availability is often around its expected
value, i.e. the base wind level. The wind generation level at
high wind and low wind scenarios are assumed to be φ% above
and below the wind generation level at the base wind scenario,
respectively. Various levels of wind availability can be captured
by changing the wind power fluctuation parameter φ [31].
In what follows, by price volatility we mean the maximum
variance of market price, i.e. maxit Var(Pitw(q?itw)). Also, by
square root of price volatility we mean the maximum standard
deviation of market price, i.e. maxit
√
Var(Pitw(q?itw).
A. One-node model simulations in South Australia
In this subsection, we first study the impacts of peak demand
levels and supply capacity shortage on the electricity price in
SA with no storage. Next, we study the effect of storage on
price volatility in SA. Fig. 1 shows the hourly prices for a day
in SA (with no storage) for three different cases: (i) a regular
demand day, (ii) a high demand day, (iii) a high demand day
with coal plants outage. An additional load of 1000 MW is
considered in the high demand case during hours 16, 17 and
18 to study the joint effect of wind intermittency and large
demand variations on the price volatility. The additional loads
are sometimes demanded in the market due to unexpected high
temperatures happening in the region. The coal-plants outage
case is motivated by the recent retirement of two coal plants
in SA with total capacity of 770 MW [32]. This allows us
to investigate the joint impact of wind indeterminacy and low
supply capacity on the price volatility.
According to Fig. 1, in a regular demand day, wind power
fluctuation with φ = 50% does not create much price fluctua-
tion. In the regular demand day, the maximum price is equal
to 194 $/MWh in the base wind scenario whereas it changes to
161 $/MWh and 244 $/MWh in the high wind and the low wind
scenarios, respectively. The square root of the price volatility in
the regular demand day is equal to 26 $/MWh. Based on Fig.
1, the maximum price in a high demand day in SA changes
from 933 $/MWh in the base wind scenario to 576 $/MWh
and 1837 $/MWh in the high wind and the low wind scenarios,
respectively. The square root of the price volatility in the high
demand day is equal to 420 $/MWh. The extra load at peak
times and the wind power fluctuation create a higher level of
price volatility during a high demand day compared with a
regular demand day.
The outage of coal plants in SA beside the extra load at
peak hours increases the price volatility due to the wind power
fluctuation. The maximum price during the high demand day
with coal plants outage varies from 3446 $/MWh to 1436
$/MWh and 9634 $/MWh in the high wind and the low wind
scenarios, respectively. The square root of the price volatility
during the high demand day with coal plant outage is equal to
2787 $/MWh. The square root of the price volatility during the
high demand day with coal plant outage is almost 107 times
more than the regular demand day due to the simultaneous
variation in both supply and demand.
hr
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
$/
M
W
h
0
200
400
(i) Hourly prices in a regular demand day
hr
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
$/
M
W
h
0
1000
2000
(ii) Hourly prices in a high demand day
Low wind
Base wind
High wind
hr
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
$/
M
W
h
0
5000
10000
(iii) Hourly prices in a high demand day with coal-plants outage
Fig. 1: Hourly wholesale electricity prices in SA with φ = 50%
and no storage.
Fig. 2 shows the minimum required (strategic/regulated)
storage capacities for achieving various levels of price volatility
in SA during a high demand day with coal plants outage.
The minimum storage capacities are calculated by solving the
optimization problem (12) for the high demand day with coal-
plants outage case with φ = 50%. According to Fig. 2, a
strategic storage firm requires a substantially larger capacity,
6compared with a regulated storage firm, to achieve a target
price volatility level due to the selfish behavior of the storage
firms. In fact, the strategic storage firms may sometimes
withhold their available capacities and do not participate in the
price volatility reduction as they do not always benefit from
reducing the price. The price volatility in SA can be reduced
by 80% using either 420 MWh strategic storage or 340 MWh
regulated storage. Note that AEMO has forecasted about 500
MWh battery storage to be installed in SA until 2035 [33].
Percentage of price volatility reduction
20% 40% 60% 80%
O
pt
im
al
 s
to
ra
ge
 c
ap
ac
it
y 
(M
W
h)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Optimal storage capacity for price volatility reduction
Strategic storage
Regulated storage
Fig. 2: Optimal strategic and regulated storage capacity for
achieving different price volatility levels in SA node with φ =
50% for a high demand day with coal-plants outage.
According to our numerical results, storage can displace the
peaking generators, with high fuel costs and market power,
which results in reducing the price level and the price volatility.
A storage capacity of 500 MWh (or 5002 MW given the
discharge coefficient ηdis = 12 ) reduces the square root of the
price volatility from 2787 $/MWh to 919 $/MWh, almost 30%
reduction, during a high demand day with coal-plant outage in
SA.
The behaviour of the peak and the daily average prices for
the high demand day with coal plants outage in SA is illustrated
in Fig. 3. In this figure, the peak price represents the maximum
of price over all scenarios during the day, i.e. maxt,w Ptw(q?tw)
and the daily average price indicates the average of price
over time and scenarios, i.e. 1NT
∑
tw Ptw(q
?
tw)Ψw. Sensitivity
analysis of the peak and the daily average prices in SA with
respect to storage capacity indicates that high storage capacities
lead to relatively low prices in the market. At very high prices,
demand is almost inelastic and a small amount of excess supply
leads to a large amount of price reduction. According to Fig.
3, the rate of price reduction decreases as the storage capacity
increases since large storage capacities lead to relatively low
peak prices which make the demand more elastic.
Based on Fig. 3, the impact of storage on the daily average
and peak prices depends on whether the storage firm is strategic
or regulated. It can be observed that the impacts of strategic
and regulated storage firms on the daily peak/average prices
are almost similar for small storage capacities, i.e. when the
storage capacity is smaller than 100 MWh (or 1002 MW given
ηdis = 12 ). However, a regulated firm reduces both the peak and
the average prices more efficiently compared with a strategic
storage firm as its capacity becomes large. A large strategic
storage firm in SA does not use its excess capacity beyond
500 MWh to reduce the market price since it acts as a strategic
profit maximizer, but a regulated storage firm contributes to the
price volatility reduction as long as there is potential for price
reduction by its operation.
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Fig. 3: Daily peak and average prices in SA versus storage
capacity with wind power fluctuation parameter φ = 50% in a
high demand day with coal-plant outage.
Fig. 4 depicts the square root of price volatility in SA during
the high demand day with coal plant outage for φ = 50%
and φ = 40%. According to this figure, the price volatil-
ity in the market decreases by installing either regulated or
strategic storage devices. However, a strategic storage firm
stops reducing the price volatility when its capacity exceeds
a threshold value. Moreover, the square root of price volatility,
in all cases, diminishes almost by 30% as the wind power
fluctuation parameter decreases from 50% to 40%. Note that,
as φ becomes small, the wind generation level becomes less
volatile which results in a relatively low price volatility. This
observation indicates that the required storage capacity to
ensure a price volatility reduction target decreases as the wind
power fluctuation parameter becomes small. Note that wind
power fluctuation parameter φ can be reduced by improving
the geographic diversity of wind farms in a region.
Based on Fig. 4, both price volatility and the required storage
capacity for achieving a target price volatility become large as
the wind power fluctuation parameter φ increases. To reduce
the square root of price volatility to 1200 $/MWh, the required
strategic capacity with φ = 40% and φ = 50% is 60 MWh and
70 MWh, respectively, more than that of a regulated storage.
This observation confirms that regulated storage firms are more
efficient than strategic firms in reducing the price volatility.
Although storage alleviates the price volatility in the market,
it is not capable to eliminate it completely.
B. Two-node model simulations in South Australia and Victoria
In the previous subsection, we analysed the impact of storage
on the price volatility in SA when the SA-VIC interconnector
7Fig. 4: Square root of price volatility in SA versus storage
capacity with φ equal to 40% and 50% during a high demand
day with coal-plants outage.
is not active. In this subsection, we first study the effect of
the interconnector between SA and VIC on the price volatility
in the absence of storage firms. Next, we investigate the
impact of storage firms on the price volatility when the SA-
VIC transmission line operates at various capacities. In our
numerical results, SA is connected to VIC using a 680 MW
interconnector which is currently operating with 70% of its
capacity, i.e. 30% of its capacity is under maintenance. The
numerical results in this subsection are based on the two-node
model for a high demand day with coal plant outage in SA. To
investigate the impact of transmission line on price volatility, it
is assumed that the SA-VIC interconnector operates with 60%
and 70% of its capacity.
According to our numerical results, the peak price in SA
and VIC is equal to 9634 $/MWh when the SA-VIC intercon-
nector is completely in outage and the wind power fluctuation
parameter φ is equal to 50%. However, the peak price reduced
to 1406 $/MWh and 1114 $/MWh when the interconnector
operates at 60% and 70% of its capacity. The square root of
price volatility is 2787 $/MWh, 303 $/MWh, and 219 $/MWh
when the capacity of the SA-VIC transmission line is equal to
0%, 60%, and 70%, respectively.
Simulation results show that as long as the transmission
line is not congested, the interconnector alleviates the price
volatility phenomenon in SA by importing electricity from VIC
to SA at peak times. Since the market in SA compared to
VIC is much smaller, about three times, the price volatility
abatement in SA after importing electricity from VIC is much
higher than the price volatility increment in VIC. Moreover,
the price volatility reduces as the capacity of transmission line
increases.
Fig. 5 shows the optimum storage capacity versus the
percentage of price volatility reduction in the two-node market.
According to our numerical results, storage is just located
in SA, which witnesses a high level of price volatility as
the capacity of transmission line decreases. According to this
figure, the optimum storage capacity becomes large as the
capacity of transmission line decreases. Note that a sudden
decrease of the transmission line capacity may result in a
high level of price volatility in SA. However, based on Fig.
5, storage firms are capable of reducing the price volatility
during the outage of the interconnecting lines.
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Fig. 5: Optimal regulated storage capacity versus the percent-
age of price volatility reduction in the two-node market with
wind power fluctuation parameter φ = 50% in a high demand
day with coal-plants outage in SA.
VI. CONCLUSION
High penetration of intermittent renewables, such as wind or
solar farms, brings high levels of price volatility in electricity
markets. Our study presents an optimization model which de-
cides on the minimum storage capacity required for achieving
a price volatility target in electricity markets. Based on our
numerical results, the impact of storage on the price volatility
in one-node electricity market of SA and two-node market of
SA-VIC can be summarized as:
• Storage alleviates price volatility in the market due to
the wind intermittency. However, storage does not remove
price volatility completely, i.e. storage stops reducing the
price volatility when it is not profitable.
• The effect of a storage firm on price volatility reduction
depends on whether the firm is regulated or strategic. Both
storage types have similar operation behaviour and price
reduction effects when they possess small capacities. For
larger capacities, a strategic firm may under-utilize its
available capacity and stop reducing the price level due
to its profit maximization strategy. On the other hand, a
regulated storage firm is more efficient in price volatility
reduction because of its social welfare maximization strat-
egy. The price level and volatility reduction patterns ob-
served when storage firms are regulated provide stronger
incentives for the market operator to subsidize the storage
technologies.
• Both storage devices and transmission lines are capable of
reducing the price volatility. High levels of price volatility
that may happen due to the line maintenance can be
alleviated by storage devices.
We intend to study the impact of ancillary services markets
[34] and capacity markets [35] on the integration of storage
systems in electricity networks in our future work. We also
8plan to investigate the impacts of other factors in both demand
and supply sides on the price volatility.
APPENDIX A
CHARGING/DISCHARGING
In this appendix, we show that the charge and discharge
levels of any storage device cannot be simultaneously positive
at the NE of the lower game. Consider a strategy in which
both charge and discharge levels of storage device i at time t
under scenario w, i.e. qdisitw, q
ch
itw, are both positive. We show
that this strategy cannot be a NE strategy as follows. The net
electricity flow of storage can be written as qsitw = η
dis
i q
dis
itw −
qchitw
ηchi
. Let q¯disitw and q¯
ch
itw be the new discharge and charge levels
of storage firm i defined as
{
q¯disitw = q
dis
itw− q
ch
itw
ηdisi η
ch
i
, q¯chitw = 0
}
if qsitw > 0, or
{
q¯disitw = 0, q¯
ch
itw = q
ch
itw − qdisitwηdisi ηchi
}
if
qsitw < 0. The new net flow of electricity can be written as
q¯sitw = η
dis
i q¯
dis
itw − q¯
ch
itw
ηchi
. Note that the new variables q¯sitw, q¯
ch
itw
and q¯disitw satisfy the constraints (5b-5e).
Considering the new charge and discharge strategies q¯disitw
and q¯chitw, instead of q
dis
itw and q
ch
itw, the nodal price and the
net flow of storage device i do not change. However, the
charge/discharge cost of the storage firm i, under the new
strategy, is reduces by:
csi
(
qchitw + q
dis
itw
)− csi (q¯disitw + q¯chitw) > 0
Hence, any strategy in which the charge and discharge variables
are simultaneously positive cannot be a NE, i.e. at the NE of
the lower game each storage firm is either in the charge mode
or discharge mode.
REFERENCES
[1] J. C. Ketterer, “The impact of wind power generation on the electricity
price in Germany,” Energy Economics, vol. 44, pp. 270–280, 2014.
[2] D. Wozabal, C. Graf, and D. Hirschmann, “The effect of intermittent
renewables on the electricity price variance,” OR spectrum, pp. 1–23,
2014.
[3] C.-K. Woo, I. Horowitz, J. Moore, and A. Pacheco, “The impact of wind
generation on the electricity spot-market price level and variance: The
Texas experience,” Energy Policy, vol. 39, no. 7, pp. 3939–3944, 2011.
[4] S.-J. Deng and S. S. Oren, “Electricity derivatives and risk management,”
Energy, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 940–953, 2006.
[5] H. Higgs and A. Worthington, “Stochastic price modeling of high volatil-
ity, mean-reverting, spike-prone commodities: The Australian wholesale
spot electricity market,” Energy Economics, vol. 30, p. 31723185, 2008.
[6] D. Chattopadhyay and T. Alpcan, “A game-theoretic analysis of wind
generation variability on electricity markets,” Power Systems, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 2069–2077, Sept 2014.
[7] AEMC, “Potential generator market power in the NEM,” Australian
Energy Market Commission, Tech. Rep., 26 April 2013.
[8] N. Li, C. Ukun, E. M. Constantinescu, J. R. Birge, K. W. Hedman, and
A. Botterud, “Flexible operation of batteries in power system scheduling
with renewable energy,” IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy,
vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 685–696, April 2016.
[9] V. Krishnan and T. Das, “Optimal allocation of energy storage in a co-
optimized electricity market: Benefits assessment and deriving indicators
for economic storage ventures,” Energy, vol. 81, pp. 175 – 188, 2015.
[10] A. Berrada and K. Loudiyi, “Operation, sizing, and economic evaluation
of storage for solar and wind power plants,” Renewable and Sustainable
Energy Reviews, vol. 59, pp. 1117 – 1129, 2016.
[11] W. Qi, Y. Liang, and Z.-J. M. Shen, “Joint planning of energy storage and
transmission for wind energy generation,” Operations Research, vol. 63,
no. 6, pp. 1280–1293, 2015.
[12] M. Sedghi, A. Ahmadian, and M. Aliakbar-Golkar, “Optimal storage
planning in active distribution network considering uncertainty of wind
power distributed generation,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 304–316, Jan 2016.
[13] L. Zheng, W. Hu, Q. Lu, and Y. Min, “Optimal energy storage system
allocation and operation for improving wind power penetration,” IET
Generation, Transmission Distribution, vol. 9, no. 16, pp. 2672–2678,
2015.
[14] J. Xiao, Z. Zhang, L. Bai, and H. Liang, “Determination of the optimal
installation site and capacity of battery energy storage system in distri-
bution network integrated with distributed generation,” IET Generation,
Transmission Distribution, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 601–607, 2016.
[15] Y. Zheng, Z. Y. Dong, F. J. Luo, K. Meng, J. Qiu, and K. P. Wong,
“Optimal allocation of energy storage system for risk mitigation of discos
with high renewable penetrations,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 212–220, Jan 2014.
[16] R. Walawalkar, J. Apt, and R. Mancini, “Economics of electric energy
storage for energy arbitrage and regulation in new york,” Energy Policy,
vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 2558 – 2568, 2007.
[17] H. Mohsenian-Rad, “Optimal bidding, scheduling, and deployment of
battery systems in california day-ahead energy market,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Power Systems, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 442–453, Jan 2016.
[18] H. Akhavan-Hejazi and H. Mohsenian-Rad, “A stochastic programming
framework for optimal storage bidding in energy and reserve markets,” in
Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT), 2013 IEEE PES, Feb 2013,
pp. 1–6.
[19] H. Mohsenian-Rad, “Coordinated price-maker operation of large energy
storage units in nodal energy markets,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 786–797, Jan 2016.
[20] E. Nasrolahpour, S. J. Kazempour, H. Zareipour, and W. D. Rosehart,
“Strategic sizing of energy storage facilities in electricity markets,” IEEE
Transactions on Sustainable Energy, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 1462–1472, Oct
2016.
[21] M. Ventosa, R. Denis, and C. Redondo, “Expansion planning in elec-
tricity markets. Two different approaches,” in Proceedings of the 14th
Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC), Seville, 2002.
[22] W.-P. Schill, C. Kemfert et al., “Modeling strategic electricity storage: the
case of pumped hydro storage in Germany,” Energy Journal-Cleveland,
vol. 32, no. 3, p. 59, 2011.
[23] J. B. Cardell, C. C. Hitt, and W. W. Hogan, “Market power and strategic
interaction in electricity networks,” Resource and Energy Economics,
vol. 19, no. 12, pp. 109 – 137, 1997.
[24] W. W. Hogan, “A market power model with strategic interaction in
electricity networks,” The Energy Journal, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 107–141,
1997.
[25] E. G. Kardakos, C. K. Simoglou, and A. G. Bakirtzis, “Optimal bidding
strategy in transmission-constrained electricity markets,” Electric Power
Systems Research, vol. 109, pp. 141 – 149, 2014.
[26] AEMO, “An Introduction to Australia’s National Electricity Market,”
Australian Energy Market Operator, Tech. Rep., 2010.
[27] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game theory. Cambridge, Mass. : M.I.T.
Press, 1991.
[28] M. C. Ferris and T. S. Munson, “GAMS/PATH user guide: Version 4.3,”
Washington, DC: GAMS Development Corporation, 2000.
[29] J. M. Morales, S. Pineda, A. J. Conejo, and M. Carrion, “Scenario reduc-
tion for futures market trading in electricity markets,” IEEE Transactions
on Power Systems, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 878–888, 2009.
[30] AEMO, “South Australian Wind Study Report,” Australian Energy
Market Operator, Tech. Rep., 2013.
[31] H. Ding, Z. Hu, and Y. Song, “Stochastic optimization of the daily
operation of wind farm and pumped-hydro-storage plant,” Renewable
Energy, vol. 48, pp. 571–578, 2012.
[32] AER, “State of the energy market 2015,” Australian Energy Regulator,
Tech. Rep., 2015.
[33] AEMO, “Roof-top PV Information Paper, National Electricity Forecast-
ing,” Australian Energy Market Operator, Tech. Rep., 2012.
[34] D. Chattopadhyay, “Multicommodity spatial cournot model for generator
bidding analysis,” Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 19, no. 1,
pp. 267–275, Feb 2004.
[35] D. Chattopadhyay and T. Alpcan, “Capacity and energy-only markets
under high renewable penetration,” Power Systems, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–11, 2015.
